In alternative disentanglement based quantum cryptosystem, classical channel cannot be used when the system is protected by no-cloning principle. But for the similar security criterion , it is discussed that classical channel can be used in alternative entanglement based quantum cryptosystem. A prototype of conventional entanglement based cryptosystem is recovered from alternative entanglement based cryptosystem, but such recovery is not possible from alternative disentanglement based cryptosystem. We conclude that entanglement based cryptosystem is superior to disentanglement based system.
Apart from security reason, study on quantum cryptography [1] [2] [3] is always important. One of such study is the comparative study on EPR and non EPR cryptosystem. This is essentially a study on entanglement versus disentanglement in a particular situation.
Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [4] comparatively studied conventional EPR and non EPR quantum key distribution (QKD). They concluded that these two cryptosystems are same in a sense which type is being used can not be distinguished by others. It follows if sender uses EPR protocol and dishonestly tells it non EPR then receiver also can not verify it. In that sense two cryptosystems are indistinguishable. It is recently understood conventional quantum bit commitment protocol -a cryptographic application-completely fails [5, 6] because of this indistinguishability of two system. Therefore Bennett et al's work becomes helpful to examine other cryptographic task. Their work was based on conventional cryptography. Recently alternative non-EPR and EPR QKD protocols have been proposed [7, 8] . Many conclusions drawn from conventional quantum cryptography do not hold good in alternative quantum cryptography. So a fresh comparative study is necessary.
It is revealed that alternative disentanglement based cryptosystem [7] uses mixed quantum state to encode a bit value but alternative entanglement based system [8] uses many pure entangled states for the same. These two quantum cryptosystems can be distinguished by the receiver. Besides these dissimilarities, they have many similarities. Both can operate entirely on quantum channel. Both provide quantum authentication. In both the system key can carry meaningful information. Secure bit commitment encoding is possible for both the systems [9] . Secure quantum coin tossing is possible for both the system [9] . A single bit can be made secure without producing other bits in the two systems.
Yet the two systems are not well understood. We have seen that classical channel and classical authentication technique can not be used in non EPR system when each individual bit is separately made secure. But we do not know whether same is true for EPR system. We also do not know whether conventional cryptography or its prototype can be recovered from these alternative systems or not. Here we shall see that on these two questions two cryptosystems differ.
Suppose a source emits pairs of spin 1/2 particle in their singlet state. One particle of each pair is flying towards Alice and its alter ego towards Bob. Let us assume that each n pairs reveal one bit of information. Alice and Bon secretly share the information of two sequences of measurements. Suppose two sequences of direction of spin-measurements are: S n 0 = {x, x, y, y, x, y, y, y, x, x, y, x, ......} and S n 1 = {y, x, x, x, y, y, x, y, y, y, x, x, ......}, where 0 and 1 in the subscripts stand for bit values and "x" and "y" are two orthogonal directions of measurements.
Let us assume they jointly decide bit values. The bit values can be decided when both of them use the same sequence of measurements. To produce a key both use S 0 and S 1 at random on their own sequences of EPR particles. When both use S 0 or S 1 , the corresponding results will be perfectly correlated. But if one use S 0 and other S 1 or vice versa, the results will not be perfectly correlated. So 50% bit value choices are discarded (the discarded bits can be used if they do not want to jointly decide the bit values). The remaining 50% bits form the key. We shall first assume they reveal results through classical public channel.
Alice's measurements yield a sequence of un-rejected data sets: R Half of their data sets contain perfectly correlated data. All the correlated data sets are unrejected and contain random numbers. Tapping the public channel Eve will get different strings of random numbers. This will not be anyway helpful.
Eavesdropper's problem is to know the secret code of measurements. For simplicity, let us think they want to produce a single bit and only Bob's particles are exposed to Eve. Eve can directly or indirectly measures using her own sequence of measurements. She gets a set of data from her measurements and taps Alice's set of data when Alice reveals the results. But these two sets of data will neither reveal any bit information nor complete information of Alice's choice of measurements. Now it's Eve's turn to reveal the results. Alice and Eve's results can not be perfectly correlated. But this can be interpreted by Alice as a case of non-identical choice of bit values. Note that in S 0 and S 1 there is a common subsequence S c . So if Alice does not get perfect correlation, she can check the data corresponding to S c . Irrespective of choice of sequences of measurements, two sets of data corresponding to S c will be always perfectly correlated. This second test exposes eavesdropping. Still it is not the last nail to eavesdropping.
The data are not secure because public channel is not authenticated channel. Eve can impersonate. After Alice's disclosure of data, Eve impersonating as Bob can reveal "fake data" correlating with Alice's data. Same thing she can do with Bob's data impersonating as Alice. Note that this attack works only for "fake correlation". That is, this attack will work when the users choose the same bit value. But they also chose different bit value in 50% cases. In those cases, data are not perfectly correlated, only the data corresponding to S c are perfectly correlated. So initially if they do not get perfect correlation between their data sets, they will get perfect correlation in the subsets. As S c is hidden in S 0 and S 1 , Eve could not generate "fake correlation in data corresponds to the sub set S c . Therefore Eve can only impersonate to select the bits not to reject the bits. Eve can leave the task of rejecting the bits for the legitimate users. It seems that system fails.
There is a rescue. The "fake correlation" attack works as both of them reveal all the data of the same events. The "fake correlation" can-not be produced if they do not reveal any data. But the data has to be revealed if the system is to run. If they do not reveal all the results of the same events, yet the system can work but "fake correlation" attack will not. For clarity, suppose they divide the results of each set into two sets. Alice's subsets are r . Because the data of two EPR partner sets are not revealed, "fake correlation" attack will not work.
To create many bits, the above produce has to be repeated. The strategy, discussed above, has to be repeatedly used to ensure bit by bit security. If any bit is found corrupted the next bit will not be produced. If eavesdropping is detected they must reject S 0 and S 1 and may try with another two pre-selected sequences of measurements.
Is it possible to recover existing quantum cryptography from alternative quantum cryptography and vice versa ? Let us see the basic difference of the two systems. In conventional cryptography, a pure state or a pure entangled state gives one or two (or many) classical bits. On the other hand in alternative quantum cryptography, many states represent a single classical bit. The key of the conventional cryptosystem does not carry meaningful information but it does carry meaningful information in alternative cryptosystem. Therefore recovery of alternative system from conventional system is not possible. But if we can produce pure state bits which does not carry any meaningful information from alternative system then at least recovery of prototype of conventional system, if not the same system, will be possible. We have two optionsrecovery of conventional EPR system from alternative EPR system and conventional non EPR system from alternative non EPR system. The former can be easily realized but the later is not.
We have seen that when both of them use S 0 or S 1 , the data are perfectly correlated. These two sets of data can make a key provided they are not revealed. Suppose Alice divides the results into three sets r contain perfectly correlated data. To construct r 3 , it is better to use the data corresponding to S c so that they always get perfectly correlated data even when they use non-identical sequences of measurements. Continuing the process two different kind of keys can be produced -the fast and slow key. The former does not exist even in the mind of the user and the later can exist in the mind of the user. If they want to produce only the former type they can share only a single sequence of measurement instead of the two.
The recovery of conventional non EPR system from alternative non EPR based system is not possible. The reason is, a sequence of single photon polarized state produces sequence of results. These results can represent bit value. But if these results are revealed they can not be secure.
Why do these systems differ on the above two issues ? The simple reason is that here repeatedly and randomly used two sequences of measurements on EPR sequences generate always different random binary sequences but repeatedly and randomly used non EPR sequences produce pseudo random binary sequences. The repeatedly used sequences of single photons can yield different random binary sequences provided the input sequences are different sequences. But in our non EPR scheme, we could not always use different sequences of single photons. That's why classical channel can not be used to reveal the results of different data sets those are pseudo-random numbers. We conclude, EPR cryptosystem is a good secure random number generator.
Throughout our discussion we relied on bit by bit security. If we do not want bit by bit security but want security of many bits (meaningful) at a time, then such security needs to be proved. In that scenario there may have a possibility of using authenticated classical channel in non EPR type system. In that eventuality we can say the use of classical channel and bit by bit security are mutually exclusive in non EPR system.
